For most of the post-Second World War era, the United States did not simply participate in global conflicts, it shaped them.
As leader of the world order, Washington set the strategic agenda and defined political end states, usually in line with international law and in coordination with allies.
In the war currently unfolding with Iran, that strategic-level clarity does not appear as strong as in previous campaigns in the Middle East, such as the decisiveness demonstrated during the First Gulf War.
Instead, the United States increasingly looks as if it is a participant in someone else’s war and is missing its strategic compass.
The U.S.’ military action against Iran may degrade missile systems, damage nuclear infrastructure or eliminate commanders and decision-makers. These would all be tactical-level military achievements.
But the outcome of a war does not rely on tactical achievements; it is decided at the political level. As the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz famously argued, war is not an end in itself but a continuation of politics by other means. For military force to have meaning, it must serve a clearly defined political objective.
At the time of writing, those objectives remain unclear. In the 12 days since the conflict began, the United States’ stated rationale for the conflict has evolved several times, ranging from deterrence and non-nuclear proliferation to broader regional security and, more recently, references to Iranian oil.
Such narrative instability does not inspire confidence. When the justification for military operations changes faster than the battlefield itself, it signals deep uncertainty about the political purpose of the war.
The ambiguity is compounded by growing concerns among some of Washington’s own allies regarding the legality of the conflict.
Several partners have questioned whether the current military actions meet the standard of international law that have historically reinforced the legitimacy of Western military coalitions.
Coalitions have always been central to American military power. Within multinational operations, there is a common saying: “If you want to go fast, go alone. If you want to go far, go with friends.”
The strength of the United States has traditionally been its ability to go far, to sustain long-term political and military efforts through broad audiences. A war perceived as strategically ambiguous and legally questionable risks eroding that collective support.
It becomes even more complex in the context of the United States’ alliance with Israel.
Israel has long viewed Iran’s nuclear ambitions and regional influence as existential threats, and its military actions reflect that perception. However, recent military operations, such as the controversial strike on a United Nations facility in Southern Lebanon, currently attributed to Israel, raises concerns about escalation and the erosion of international norms.
For Israel, it might be justified. For the United States, association with them carries far riskier diplomatic consequences.
Without a coherent political strategy, even a superpower risks being directed by the strategic priorities of others, in this case, Israel.
When a superpower fights a war its allies question and whose objectives it cannot clearly define, it stops acting like a leader and starts looking like a proxy.
